Why Vietnam (1965)

toward greater industrialization, a rich prize indeed in the eyes of communist strategists. At Gettysburg College in 1959, President Eisenhower clearly recognizes the danger. We have learned too that the cost of defending freedom of defending America must be paid in many forms and in many places. They are assessed in all parts of the world in Berlin, in Vietnam, in the Middle East, here at home. When assisted, Vietnam can not, at this time, produce and support the military formations essential to it, military, as well as economic help is currently needed in Vietnam. By 1960, every area of life in the South has become a combat zone. This is a different kind of war.

There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. But this is really war. It is guided by North Vietnam and it is spurred by communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South and to extend the Asian dominion of communism. And there are great stakes in the balance. No people see this more clearly than the embattled, hard-pressed Vietnamese. By 1961, they send out an urgent call for help. The answer to that call is prompt in arriving. America promises substantial military and technical aid, machines and equipment to resist aggression, and the trained men to teach Vietnamese fighting forces how to put them into effective use.

The American advisors are specialists, highly trained and motivated, often able to speak to trainees in their own language. Instructors and advisors willing and able to teach. Find men whose freedom is at stake, eager and quick to learn. At this time, however, the Americans in Vietnam are their only advisors. There are no United States combat units as such. The advisor's primary job is to train and encourage the South Vietnamese fighting men they have come to respect and admire. This guerrilla warfare is the latest tactic in the global communist plan. Korea showed that the free world would meet and stop conventional invasion.

And communists' efforts to dominate newly emerging nations through trade, aid and political subversion had little success. Now a new kind of politically camouflaged invasion must be faced, the so-called People's War of Liberation. As months go by, the communists lose a lot of men, but there are many more in the north who will be sent south to replace them, and others can be kidnapped and forced to serve. Meantime, in addition to training Vietnamese fighting men, American advisor teams are working constantly to help relieve the human suffering of remote villages. Through pressure of growing communist aggression, the flow of American equipment and advisors is increased.

It is the only means of meeting the rising tide of infiltration and attack from the north, especially since aggressive guerrillas with no citizenry to protect can tie up forces ten times their own number. Superior equipment and mobility are used to full advantage to carry the fight to the enemy, swiftly. However, his presence becomes known. The Vietnamese soldier is quick to grasp the techniques involved in copter-born counteraction to guerrilla raids on country villages, and he uses his new knowledge well. Even with superior equipment, however, this is a difficult war. There are no front lines here. The war is everywhere against an enemy that has seldom clearly seen. In these scenes of casualty evacuation, the enemy is not far away, certainly within

shouting distance. The enemy is not seen, but American and Vietnamese fighting men bear on their bodies the painful evidence that he is still here. Still determined, still deeply. Throughout this time, the combat capability of South Vietnam's military forces is growing. American advisors work to bring the level of training and combat readiness of these forces as high as possible. But as North Vietnam continues to send in fresh cadres, there is a growing need in South Vietnam for fighting men. The losses suffered by the South in combat are cruelly heavy, for a nation whose population is no larger than that of New York State. The fact is, in proportion to population, South Vietnam's losses in combat are 10 times

as great as those suffered by the United States in Korea, greater even than our total losses in World War II. Then in August of 1964, the communists again enlarged the scope of the conflict. Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply. That reply is being given, as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations.

Never until now have American men and machines struck directly at communist North Vietnam. Later in August, Secretary of Defense McNamara sets the record straight. We wish to emphasize we seek no wider war. Our response will depend upon the action of the aggressors, in this case the North Vietnamese. The key to the situation remains the cessation of infiltration from the North into the South. We seek no wider war. But we find ample evidence that there is no reminding on the part of the North. In this one captured shipment of Viet Cong arms, there are a million rounds of small arms ammunition, 3,500 rifles, submachine guns, and some 4,000 anti-tank and mortar. There are rounds, and there is no doubt about the source. The Chinese markings are unmistakable.

In meeting the aggression so clearly evidenced here, we have sent strength to meet force. But we have also repeatedly sent word that we are willing to talk, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk makes plain. Our war aim in South Vietnam is peace. President Johnson has directed me to do everything possible to bring this matter from the battlefield to the conference table.